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ROBERT S. SUMMERS 
WORKING CONCEPTIONS OF "THE LAW" 
1. PREFATORY NOTE 
This exploratory essay is an admixture of amateur psychology, 
moral theory, and jurisprudence. It grows out of seminars I have 
given for judges, and reflects that focus.1 Co-theorists will now 
see some of what I have been telling practitioners. And error in my 
story may be exposed. But one can have no qualms about this. It 
is especially important to have things put right for judges. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
I will consider the work of judges in civil law cases, and will begin 
with one of many possible examples. In 1809, English judges 
decided a now famous case, one with extraordinarily wide-ranging 
influence. The full original report of the case reads as follows: 
Butterfield v. Forrester 
(1809) 11 East 60 (KB) 
This was an action on the case for obstructing a highway, by means of which 
obstruction the plaintiff, who was riding along the road, was thrown down 
with his horse, and injured, &c. At the trial before Bayley J. at Derby, it 
appeared that the defendant, for the purpose of making some repairs to his 
house, which was close by the road side at one end of the town, had put up a 
pole across this part of the road, a free passage being left by another branch 
or street in the same direction. That the plaintiff left a public house not far 
distant from the place in question at 8 o'clock in the evening in August, when 
1 Several ideas in this essay were presented in June 1978 to judges in semi- 
nars at Madison, Wisconsin, and at the Harvard Law School. I am indebted to 
these judges for comments. I am grateful to Professors David Lyons and 
Roger C. Cramton for helpful criticism. I also wish to thank Mr Leigh Kelley 
and Mr Erik M. Jensen, Cornell Law School classes of 1980 and 1979, respec- 
tively, for valuable research and editorial assistance. 
Law and Philosophy 1 (1982) 263-289. 0167-5249/82/0012-0263 S02.70 
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they were just beginning to light candles, but while there was light enough 
left to discern the obstruction at 100 yards distance: and the witness, who 
proved this, said that if the plaintiff had not been riding very hard he might 
have observed and avoided it: the plaintiff however, who was riding violently, 
did not observe it, but rode against it, and fell with his horse and was much 
hurt in consequence of the accident; and there was no evidence of his being 
intoxicated at the time. On this evidence Bayley J. directed the jury, that if 
a person riding with reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and 
avoided the obstruction; and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff was 
riding along the street extremely hard, and without ordinary care, they 
should find a verdict for the defendant: which they accordingly did. [The 
plaintiff moved for a new trial.] 
Bayley J. The plaintiff was proved to be riding as fast as his horse could 
go, and this was through the streets of Derby. If he had used ordinary care 
he must have seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen 
entirely from his own fault. 
Lord Ellenborough C. J. A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction 
which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he do 
not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right. In cases of 
persons riding upon what is considered to be the wrong side of the road, that 
would not authorise another purposely to ride up against them. One person 
being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. 
Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by 
the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the 
part of the plaintiff. [New trial denied.] 
As interpreted by most subsequent judges (though not without 
some license), the foregoing precedent stands for the so-called 
"complete bar" rule to the effect that if a plaintiff is contributo- 
rily negligent, he may not recover any compensation from a defen- 
dant whose negligent act or omission also contributed to the plain- 
tiff's loss. (There are qualifications but we need not go into them 
here.) 
Now consider a second case (my summary of the report): 
Maki v. Frelk 
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1968 
239 N.E.2d 445 
Decedent was killed in an auto collision at an intersection. The plaintiff was 
administratrix of the decedent's estate and was suing the defendant, driver of 
the other car, for wrongful death. In counts one and two of the complaint, 
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the plaintiff alleged that the decedent exercised due care for his own safety 
(was not contributorily negligent), and that the defendant negligently caused 
the accident by driving too fast, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to 
keep his car under control, and operating a car without adequate brakes. In 
the third count, the plaintiff did not allege the decedent's own freedom from 
contributory negligence, but did allege the defendant's negligence, and alleged 
that if there was any negligence on the part of the decedent, the plaintiff 
could still win because the decedent's negligence, if any, "was less than the 
negligence of the defendant, when compared." 
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion to strike this third count 
on the basis of Illinois case law following Butterfield v. Forrester. The inter- 
mediate court of appeals reversed, and thus repudiated Butterfield v. Forrester. 
However, on appeal to the highest court of Illinois, the trial judge's ruling was 
affirmed. 
Thus, in 1968, a majority of judges of the Illinois Supreme 
Court in Maki v. Frelk purported to follow Butterfield v. Forrester 
and its progeny faithfully.2 Yet one of the acknowledged leaders 
among American scholars of tort law had already called the "com- 
plete bar" rule the "harshest doctrine known to the common 
law,"3 a characterization that may be justified especially since the 
doctrine precludes even a slightly negligent plaintiff from recov- 
ering anything from a grossly negligent defendant. In 1945 the 
English had abandoned this precedent by a statute apportioning 
recoverable damages in accord with estimates of each negligent 
party's share of responsibility for the loss.4 By 1968, several 
American state legislatures had followed suit.5 Subsequently, the 
highest state courts of a few American states (e.g. Florida, 1973 
2 One justification the judges offered for this course cf action was that, in 
their view, any change should come from the legislature. I cannot go into this 
complex issue here. 3 L. Green, 'Illinois Negligence Law', Illinois Law Review 39 (1944): 36. 
4 See generally Glanville L. Williams, 'The Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act, 1945', Modem Law Review 9 (1946): 105-186. 5 Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (Indianapolis: Allen Smith, 
1974), pp. 12-15. 
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and California, 1975) acted on their own to abandon the complete 
bar rule.6 
What explains Maki v. Frelk? The various factors that influence 
judges are numerous and complex, and they vary somewhat from 
judge to judge. For my purposes, however, it is not necessary to 
try to offer a comprehensive account. There are at least four 
possible explanations for the Illinois court's refusal in Maki v. 
Frelk to abandon the "harshest doctrine known to the common 
law": (1) the judges believed (what, in my view, would be mis- 
taken) that only the Illinois legislature had power to modify the 
"complete bar" rule, or (2) the judges simply failed to reason 
through the conflicting considerations as they should have and 
decided against the plaintiff, even though, according to the allega- 
tions, the defendant was partly responsible, or (3) the judges, in 
deciding the case, were unduly influenced by a particular working 
conception of "the law," and this led them to uphold the harsh 
doctrine, or (4) some combination of the foregoing. 
The working conception most likely figuring here in an explana- 
tion of the third possible kind is easy enough to identify: "The 
law" governing an issue to be decided consists of a pre-existing 
rule 7 - the "complete bar" rule of Butterfield v. Forrester. Judges 
unduly influenced by this working conception would vote to 
uphold the harshest doctrine known to the common law. Of 
course, such a working conception does not itself require this 
result. It is only a working conception, and judges not obsessed 
with it would not give it an undue or disproportionate place in 
their thinking. Instead, they would vote to overrule a case like 
Butterfield v. Forrester (unless they rightly believed that the 
matter should be left only to the legislature). In voting to overrule, 
6 Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1-226 
(1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 7 The most influential of American Judges, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once 
put it this way: "My job is to play the game according to the rules." (L. 
Hand, 'Address', in Continuing Legal Education for Professional Competence 
and Responsibility (Philadelphia: Joint Committee on Continuing Legal 
Education, 1959), p. 119.) 
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these judges would be abandoning, for this case, "the law" that 
their working conception had put them on to and would be tur- 
ning to other normative phenomena of "the law" that should here 
have primacy. These other phenomena include (1) the law's 
commitment to the reassessment of precedent in light of reason 
and (2) the discretionary power of common law judges to overrule 
unsound precedent. 
In this essay, I will concentrate on the roles of working concep- 
tions in judicial decisions. I will not try to prove that this factor 
actually helps explain the decision in Maki v. Frelk. Nor, of 
course, will I try to establish the general extent to which judges 
are influenced by their working conceptions. But from my reading 
of opinions over many years, and from numerous discussions with 
judges, I have concluded that such conceptions do play important 
roles, both for good and for ill. They can facilitate sound decision 
making. Indeed, one would hope that this is the usual result. Some 
judges, however, become preoccupied with their working ideas of 
"the law." And there is evidence that this sometimes affects out- 
comes. These conclusions should surprise no one. Working concep- 
tions are useful (in ways I will try to explain). Indeed, they are 
pragmatic necessities for most judges. That some proportion of 
judges will become preoccupied with such conceptions seems more 
or less inevitable. 
It would help if judges were more conscious of the possible 
adverse effects of becoming preoccupied with a working concep- 
tion of "the law," and I offer this essay partly to that end. Judges 
conscious of the limits of their working conceptions will be far 
less likely to become imprisoned in them. I also offer this essay 
as a partial account of what it is for a judge to have a philosophy 
of law. But my main purpose here is to explore whether there is 
an alternative working conception that might be better than the 
influential notion that law consists of pre-existing rules - better 
in that (1) it would be a more serviceable working conception as 
such; or (2) its normative effects would be preferable; or (3) the 
consequences of judicial obsession with it would be less untoward; 
or (4) some combination of the foregoing. I believe there is a 
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better alternative working conception, and it is one in which 
morality plays a major part. 
3. THE NATURE OF A WORKING CONCEPTION 
I must first discuss what I take a working conception to be, and I 
will continue to use the notion of "law as pre-existing rule" for 
illustrative purposes. 
As I conceive it, a working conception is not the same as what 
Professor Hart has called a "criterion of legal validity."8 Such a 
conception might specify a feature required for a form of law to 
be valid within a system, but it need not. Thus a criterion of legal 
validity within a society might, for example, be that the law, what- 
ever form it happens to take, must be promulgated by Rex. And 
judges might have a working conception of the law as "rules made 
by Rex." Yet judges in this society might hold a working concep- 
tion of the law devoid of any reference to Rex, too. Virtually all 
all of them might conceive of "the law" simply as pre-existing 
rules (and there might be few other social rules). Furthermore, as 
I conceive it, a working notion of the law is not as such binding 
upon a judge, whereas a true criterion of legal validity is. 
A working conception is not the same as a working hypothesis 
as to the likely actual substantive content of relevant law.9 Rather, 
it is "prior" to any such hypothesis. It is a kind of conceptual 
schema, and it may be one that can accommodate almost any 
particular substantive content. 
Nor is a working notion necessarily the same as an "ideal type" 
of law.10 It is possible to imagine, for example, an ideal type of a 
8 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 
chapter 6. 9 Similarly, it is not the same as a "hunch" as to the right result in a case. 
See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 'The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision', Comell Law Quarterly 14 (1928/9): 274- 
288. 
10 I refer here to Weber's notion of an "ideal type." See his 'Religious Rejec- 
tions of the World and their Directions', in From Max Weber: Essays in 
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legal rule - one that is precise, clear, prospective, and in still other 
ways formally ideal. A notion of "the law as pre-existing rule" 
could, however, qualify as a working conception even if the con- 
cept of a rule embodied in it did not have such features. 
My notion of a working idea is one in which "the law" is con- 
ceptualized in terms of one, or at most two types of recurrent nor- 
mative phenomena of "the law." These phenomena may also be 
thought of as "justificatory resources"; they are themselves varied 
and complex, and, in Anglo-American systems, include: 
(a) pre-existing rules, 
(b) actual reasons for those rules, 
(c) equities between the parties outside any relevant rules, 
(d) discretionary judgment (including that involved in the 
overruling or modification of precedent), 
(e) the bearing of ideas of justice and the common good 
characteristically found in some forms of law, 
(f) the general dictates of reason, including "goal" reasons 
and "rightness" reasons, relevant to the justification of 
judicial decisions, and 
(g) fiat. 
A working conception, however, leaves things out; it is only a par- 
tial schematization. Thus, for example, judges who adopt a wor- 
king conception of "the law" as pre-existing rules adopt a notion 
that leaves out the foregoing other important normative phenom- 
ena of the law that may also be relevant to issues for decision. 
(Many judges who hold a rule conception also incorporate the 
reason or reasons for the rules, too.) 
But that a particular conception leaves out important phenom- 
ena of "the law" is in itself not a criticism of that notion as a 
working conception. In my view, to be serviceable to the usual 
judge, such a notion must be partial and selective. Only the ablest 
Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946), pp. 323-359. The editors of this volume also discuss 
Weber's notion at pp. 59-61 of their Introduction. 
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judge could wield a working conception qua working conception 
that encompasses all normative phenomena of "the law." (On this, 
more later.) Furthermore, a conception that meets the five thres- 
hold requirements of a viable working conception (soon to be set 
forth) will, on its own, serve a judge well in a substantial propor- 
tion of cases. That is, he will not have to resort to other phenom- 
ena of the law to dispose of these cases appropriately. Indeed, this 
is one factor that accounts for the widespread judicial resort to a 
rule conception. The phenomena of the law relevant to decision 
just do consist, in a significant proportion of cases, of pre-existing 
rules (and the reasons therefor). Thus in all such cases the inevi- 
tably partial nature of a working conception can hardly be pre- 
judicial or dysfunctional. Indeed that characterization may be 
thought of as part of the very "beauty" of a viable working con- 
ception. Of course, even in the cases to which a working concep- 
tion readily applies and which would lead to an analysis that 
ought to be determinative, it is still possible for judges to go 
wrong. A working conception is not aguarantee. 
It does not follow, however, that if a judge brings a serviceable 
working conception to an issue for decision this judge must, ought 
to, or will decide that issue solely in light of the general feature or 
features of phenomena of "the law" embodied in that conception. 
On the contrary, the judge ought to decide in light of phenomena 
of the law that emerge as relevant and appropriate bases for 
decision, even when these phenomena turn out, in the circumstan- 
ces, not to be incorporated in his working conception. And, on my 
account, the judge who is not unduly influenced by his working 
conception will generally so decide. After all, his conception is 
only a working idea. 
In my view, a viable working conception of the law is, however, 
a pragmatic necessity for the usual judge. When performing intel- 
lectual operations with the law, this judge needs some general 
notion of what he is performing them on, and for. A working con- 
ception of "the law" is such a notion. Note that I do not claim 
that a working conception is a conceptual necessity. And some 
judges may get along without any such idea. 
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In a related way, a viable working idea of the law is functionally 
serviceable. One conception may be preferable to another on 
grounds of comparative serviceability. First, it might facilitate the 
identification of pre-existing law better than some other general 
idea. For example, in Anglo-American systems, a rule conception 
would more often lead judges to relevant authoritative materials 
than would an "unfettered discretion" notion of law. Second, one 
conception may put the judge on to a better interpretational 
method than another. Thus a notion of the law as a reasoned 
reconciliation of conflicting considerations would lead the usual 
judge to interpret statutes, for example, in accord with their 
rationales more readily than would a rule conception (at least if 
the latter itself omitted rationales). Third, one conception might, 
better than any other, facilitate the identification and resolution 
of issues calling for the creation of new law. It should be evident, 
for example, that the notion of law as pre-existing rule provides 
little sustenance to the judge who must decide a case of first 
impression. A working conception may be serviceable in still other 
ways, too. 
Before a conception can be at all adequately serviceable in the 
foregoing ways, it must satisfy five "criteria of viability" which I 
will now sketch (and only that). Since the idea of law as pre-exis- 
ting rule satisfies these criteria, I will illustrate each criterion with 
it. 
First, an idea cannot qualify if not faithful to law's reality. 
Obviously, ideas of space exploration, or of the modern novel, are 
essentially foreign to law and thus cannot count as, or figure in, 
what I call a working notion of the law. Pre-existing rules, on the 
other hand, are not at all foreign to the law, and thus readily 
qualify. (Of course, this is not to say that the whole of the law 
consists of rules or that rules are law.) 
Second, the notion must be sufficiently unitary. Otherwise, it 
cannot be serviceable as a working conception (at least for the 
ordinary judge). Again, the pre-existing rule idea qualifies, even if 
reasons for the rules are included. Such a conception would thus 
embody three related elements: rule, reasons, and pre-existence. 
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Of course, an unusually able judge might have a conception that is 
"total" and thus embodies all phenomena of the law. But any such 
all-encompassing conception could not be of service to the usual 
judge. It would be too complex, and thus too cumbersome for him 
to "wield all at once." And it would not be sufficiently "selective." 
Third, since in our systems, law ranges over nearly every nook 
and cranny of social life, a serviceable working idea of "the law" 
must be widely applicable - not narrowly pocketed or restricted 
to specific varieties of social relations. Again, a rule conception 
qualifies. This is not to say that pre-existing rules exist for, or are 
justifiably applicable to, all, or even the overwhelming majority of, 
issues arising for decision. 
Fourth, the phenomenon, or phenomena, of the law picked out 
by a working conception must be sufficiently represented or 
instantiated numerically within the totality of legal phenomena. 
Thus, a phenomenon that rarely recurs could not qualify. For 
example, the relation of circular priority in mortgage law could 
not. Nor could "adverse possession." But pre-existing rules could. 
Rules are ubiquitous in the law. 
Fifth, the conception must not be vacuous or unduly indeter- 
minate. The notion of law as pre-existing rules satisfies this crite- 
rion, too. (On this, more later.) 
A viable working conception is one that is functionally service- 
able. It facilitates the identification of relevant law, the adoption 
of sound interpretational method, the application of reason afresh 
when called for, and more. To be serviceable in such ways, a wor- 
king conception must sufficiently satisfy the foregoing criteria of 
viability. 
It does not follow, however, that a serviceable working concep- 
tion. There are two basic forms that this can take in the case of 
trary, a judge may be unduly influenced by any working concep- 
tion. There are two basic forms given this can take in the case of 
a judge who holds a rule conception. First, let us assume that the 
rule notion is prima facie applicable to the issue at hand (the issue 
is one to which some version of a pre-existing rule is actually 
relevant). Even so, it may be that in the end the particular rule 
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should not control; yet our judge may fail to see this. For 
example, reason may reveal that the rule is the harshest doctrine 
of the common law and require that it be overruled. Or, for 
example, it may be that equities between the parties have arisen in 
the particular case (for which the rule does not provide) and these 
ought to control.11 Second, our preoccupied judge may fail to see 
that his working conception of the law as pre-existing rule is not 
even prima facie applicable to the issue at hand, for the case is a 
genuine case of first impression, or a statutory casus omissus. In 
these cases there is no pre-existing rule, yet our judge acts as if 
there were, by, for example, invoking a far-fetched analogy. 
4. POSSIBLE WORKING CONCEPTIONS 
I have already said that a conception of "the law" as pre-existing 
rule qualifies as one possible working conception and that many 
judges actually hold this idea. I have also said that some judges 
become obsessed with it, and that this helps account for some bad 
outcomes. But in my view, nothing inherent in the nature of law, 
or of the judge's role, requires that a judge hold this particular 
working idea. I will now consider whether certain other possibili- 
ties also satisfy the relevant qualifying criteria of viability. Among 
these are the following (each of which, except perhaps the first, 
has some actual subscribers among judges): 
(1) The law is whatever the equities between the parties dic- 
tate in the particular case. 
This possible working conception fails to qualify for lack of 
sufficient numerical significance (fourth criterion). In a very high 
proportion of cases, there are no relevant "equities" between the 
parties (or the equities are not appropriately determinative). 
(2) The law is whatever the official organs of final applica- 
tion within the system say it is. 
1 On the nature of such equities, see Robert S. Summers, 'General Equitable 
Principles under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code', North- 
western Law Review 72 (1978): 906. 
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This candidate might be called the "unfettered discretion" or 
"free law" idea. Although popular in some jurisprudential circles, 
it cannot qualify either. At least in Anglo-American systems, it 
lacks the required phenomenological felicity (first criterion). The 
law in these systems is not (and never has been) a game of scorer's 
discretion. A judge is almost never free to take the view that the 
law is entirely "up to me." 
(3) The law consists of certain characteristic substantive 
ideas of justice and of the common good. 
Of course, we do have certain received ideas of justice and the 
common good, and some of these may even be more or less 
characteristic of the content of much law, at least in Anglo-Ameri- 
can legal systems. But this candidate fails, nonetheless. The rele- 
vant ideas do not have sufficient range and bearing, given the 
diverse, and detailed, nature of the issues judges must face (third 
and fifth criteria). Moreover, some notions of justice and the com- 
mon good have been (and are) more ideal than real and thus lack 
sufficient phenomenological felicity (first criterion). Laws applica- 
ble to blacks in the Southern United States until after World War 
II are perhaps most dramatically illustrative (within recent Anglo- 
American legal history). 
(4) The law is a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting con- 
siderations. 
Hereafter I will refer to the foregoing as the "reason concep- 
tion" or as the notion of "law as reason" (not to be confused with 
that of Aquinas). Does this notion qualify as a viable working con- 
ception? 
First, it is phenomenologically felicitous. Reasoned resolutions 
are not at all foreign to the law. Of course, this is not to say that 
these resolutions are always sound. Nor is it to say that reason 
properly rules all. Some role for fiat in the law is inevitable (as, for 
example, in determining the number of years required for an 
adverse possessor to get title).12 
12 See generally Lon L. Fuller, 'Reason and Fiat in Case Law', Harvard Law 
Review 59 (1945/6): 376-395. 
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Second, a reason conception is sufficiently unitary. 
Third, the scope and potential bearing of the notion of law as 
reason is sufficient. Indeed, it may be the most wide-ranging of 
candidates. 
Fourth, the relevance of the idea of reasoned resolution is suf- 
ficiently recurrent to qualify as a working conception. That is, it 
would regularly "come into play." 
Fifth, the notion of law as reason is not unduly indeterminate 
or vague. Over a wide range of issues, the weight of reason is often 
heavily on one side.13 It is also possible to define and analyse the 
types of substantive reasons that rationally figure in deciding and 
justifying court decisions (something I have attempted elsewhere).14 
These types are twofold: "goal reasons" and "rightness reasons." 
A goal reason derives its justificatory force from the fact that, at 
the time it is given, the decision it supports can be predicted to 
have effects that serve a good goal. (The goal may or may not have 
been previously recognized in the law.) A good rightness reason 
does not derive its justificatory force from predicted goal-serving 
effects of the decision it supports. Rather, it draws its force from 
the way in which the decision accords with a moral norm of right- 
ness as applied to a party's actions or to a state of affairs resulting 
from those actions. Most rightness reasons are past-regarding - 
they have to do with how the case came about. All goal reasons 
are future-regarding. (Of course, a goal reason may have to do with 
bringing about more rightness.) Judges know how to construct and 
evaluate reasons of both types. Thus, "reason" is not a vague and 
vacuous category that frees judges to import their own personal 
prejudice and bias in the guise of reason. Moreover, a judge com- 
mitted to a working conception in the form of a reasoned recon- 
ciliation of conflicting considerations will be opposed to deciding 
cases on the basis merely of personal prejudice, bias, or idiosyn- 
13 ibid. 
14 Robert S. Summers, 'Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a 
Theory of Common-Law Justification', Cornell Law Review 63 (1977/8): 
707-788. 
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cratic views. It does not follow that such a judge will, by virtue of 
his commitment, always reach the best justified result in the case. 
Again, a working conception is not a guarantee. 
It may forestall misunderstanding if I stress once more that a 
judge who rationally depends upon a working conception does 
not, however, ignore phenomena of the law not embodied in his 
conception. Thus a judge who harbors a reason conception ought 
to abandon its dictates if reason and the legal materials relevant to 
the problem turn out to counsel as much. For example, such a 
judge may end up applying a pre-existing rule. Just because a judge 
typically thinks in the first instance of law as reason it does not 
follow that he cannot also believe in rules or the rule of law. 
Similarly, a judge who harbors a rule conception may even end up 
overruling a precedent that he in the end thinks goes beyond the 
bounds of reason (e.g., the complete bar rule of Butterfield v. 
Forrester). It is one thing to have a working conception and 
another to be unduly influenced by it. A judge who is not obsessed 
will depart from the dictates of his working notion as circumstan- 
ces demand. A working notion is only that. It is only a partial and 
nonbinding schematization of the law, and the methodologically 
selfconscious judge will treat it as such. Generally, then, two dif- 
ferent judges, one with a reason conception and the other a rule 
conception, will, if not obsessed, end up deciding the same issues 
in the same way. 
Even so, there is still much to choose between if one is con- 
sidering whether it is better for a judge to hold a rule or a reason 
conception. 
5. THE "REASON" AND THE "RULE" ALTERNATIVES: 
SOME COMPARISONS 
Given that the notion of law as a reasoned resolution qualifies as a 
possible working conception, the further question arises: Is the 
reason alternative better than the more widely held rule notion? 
I will, in this section, compare these alternatives on two grounds: 
serviceability, and normative "side effects." 
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A. Comparative Serviceability 
It is not possible here to compare exhaustively the efficacy of the 
two main alternatives. I will treat efficacy for judges, and then 
only in relation to what I conceive to be three primary functions 
of a working conception. At this exploratory stage, my conclusions 
can be only tentative. 
One primary function of any working conception is to facilitate 
the identification of relevant pre-existing normative phenomena 
(justificatory resources) of the law. It may be that the notion of 
law as reason can fulfill this function better than the rule idea. It 
caters for more varieties of pre-existing law than does the rule con- 
ception. In general, reason figures prominently in the law, including 
the content of pre-existing rules. It follows that when a judge 
seeks to determine relevant forms of pre-existing law he may 
safely assume these to be phenomena in which reason somehow 
significantly figures, except when fiat necessarily holds sway, or 
when predecessors have simply failed to bring reason to bear at all 
(and this is rare). These latter two exceptional varieties of law for 
which a reason conception does not cater in the processes by 
which judges determine relevant pre-existing law must be com- 
pared with varieties for which a rules notion does not cater. These 
latter varieties include: (1) law governing exercises of discretion in 
accord with substantive criteria not reducible to rule; (2) law in 
the form of "equities" between the parties in the particular case - 
equities themselves not specifiable in rules; (3) law in the form 
merely of case law "holdings" with accompanying reasons (not 
readily reducible to rule). Even if the rule notion is one that also 
incorporates the reasons behind the rules, it is not at all evident 
that it would then cater for the foregoing important varieties of 
"non-rule" law. In sum, the rule notion ranges over far less of the 
normative phenomena of the law than the reason conception. 
Moreover, I believe that the reason notion "takes hold" in a 
higher proportion of the total instances of law identification than 
does the rule notion. To put this another way, the proportion of 
instances in which the pre-existing law to be identified consists of 
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fiat (necessarily) or of failed reason is far smaller than the propor- 
tion of instances in which pre-existing law does not consist of 
rules. 
A second primary function of a working conception is to facili- 
tate the sound interpretation of relevant pre-existing law once 
identified. Much pre-existing law requires interpretation. Yet there 
are basic alternative approaches to interpretation - the literal and 
the rationale-oriented.15 Though I cannot go into this here, the 
latter is vastly superior. Thus a working conception that tends to 
put judges on to the rationale-oriented approach is, in my view, 
the more serviceable. I think the notion of law as a reasoned 
reconciliation of conflicting considerations does just this. It more 
or less naturally calls for a rationale-oriented approach, for the law 
itself is conceived mainly in such terms. A conception of law as 
rules, on the other hand, is at best more or less neutral as between 
the literal and the rationale-oriented, and a case can be made that 
the rule notion and the literal are far more congenial than the rule 
notion and the rationale-oriented. This is, I think, certainly true if 
the rule conception is one that does not also incorporate reasons 
behind the rules. And even if it does, some differences on this 
score may still remain. 
A third primary function of a working conception is to facili- 
tate the identification and resolution of issues calling for creation 
of new law. The rule conception presupposes that the law takes 
the form of a pre-existing rule. Thus when new legal needs arise, a 
judge must immediately turn away from this conception (except for 
such sustenance as it may provide by analogy). On the other hand, 
a judge who holds a reason conception will find that it, as such, 
stands him in good stead when new legal needs arise. It recognizes 
that much of the law is not "pre-existing" but must be made up in 
light of reason as we go along. The law is not something that 
simply "is the case" - a hard chunk of reality. Rather "the law" 
must often be argued for. Gaps in the law present themselves. 
Authorities come into conflict. Mistakes and misjudgments occur 
15 There is a vast legal literature on these two approaches. 
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(as in the doctrine of Butterfield v. Forrester). Change brings new 
needs and renders old law obsolete. Interpretation itself imposes 
creative demands. Thus numerous issues of varying types arise for 
which pre-existing rules provide no, or only an inadequate, 
solution, and to which reason must be applied afresh. The 
superiority of a reason conception is evident, too, when it is 
recalled that frequently a sharp line cannot be drawn between pre- 
existing law and new law anyway. The rule conception requires 
that such a line be drawn.16 
I should concede at this point that for the ablest judges it may 
be that neither alternative working conception is any more, or less, 
serviceable than the other in any of the foregoing three ways. 
These judges will be relatively less dependent on working concep- 
tions, and may on their own readily identify relevant law, adopt 
preferred interpretational method, and come to grips with 
problems of making new law from scratch. (It may also be true 
that the ablest, and perhaps even the abler, judges will only rarely 
become obsessed with a working conception. On this, more later.) 
B. "Normative" Side Effects 
Pursuit of each basic alternative working idea has subtle normative 
implications for judges generally. The most general norm 
"implied" for other judges who learn that a judge is following a 
rule idea might be formulated: "Generally do things by well-made 
rule." Similarly, the norm "implied" by the reason notion would 
be: "Generally do things by sound reason." We may assume that 
the side effects of the former would include an increase in the 
proportion of well-formed rules within the system, and the side 
effects of the latter, more soundly reasoned resolutions than 
otherwise. 
In moral and political terms, what might be the general com- 
parative value of the two types of side effects, assuming that they 
16 See further Robert S. Summers, 'Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and 
America's Dominant Philosophy of Law', Harvard Law Review 92 (1978/9): 
433-449. 
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turn out to be roughly equivalent quantitatively? (This is a large 
assumption, but empirical study of relative quantity would be 
exceedingly difficult if not impossible.) I will begin by trying to 
put the case for the importance of rules as strongly as I can. 
In a variety of ways it could be valuable for a given society to 
have more rules (and better formed ones) than it actually has.17 
Rules can restrict scope for official arbitrariness, secure that like 
cases (as marked out by the law) are treated alike, bring regularity 
and predictability, and facilitate "followability" of the law and 
"self-regulation." 
Relatedly, rules are among the things that enable us to have 
confidence in officials. When citizens know that officials must 
follow known rules this diminishes an important source of in- 
security. Citizens "know where they stand." And they also know 
it is at least harder for officials discriminatorily to victimize an 
individual under a regime of known rules, for rules apply to all 
who fall within their terms. 
A requirement that officials proceed by known rule (where 
appropriate) may exert pressure for sound substantive content. 
At least demands for justification will be heard more often and 
with more focus under a regime of known rules than under a 
regime in which officials proceed ad hoc. Moreover, if officials 
address themselves only to particulars of the case at hand, they 
will not do as well at weeding out irrelevancy as they would if 
forced to formulate and follow general rules. 
Further, procedural rules define features of legal processes 
required for the regular realization of "process values," e.g., fair- 
ness and participation.18 Without a sufficient number of well- 
formed rules, this form of value realization would significantly 
diminish. 
17 For a recent book devoted in major part to this theme, see Kenneth C. 
Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Urbana, Ill.: University 
of Illinois Press, 1971). 
18 See Robert S. Summers, 'Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - 
A Plea for "Process Values",' Cornell Law Review 60 (1974/5): 1-52. 
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Rules also serve as required means, more or less, to substantive 
ends. A full articulation of how this is so would take us far afield. 
It is enough for my purposes to cite examples. Without known 
rules, a value of such importance as liberty would be far harder to 
secure, for rules demarcate boundaries with distinctive efficacy 
and thus enable citizens to plan and choose on their own within 
these boundaries. Without rules, the welfare state as we know it 
would be impossible, for it would be impossible to set up and run 
an effective system of taxation. Without rules, dispute settlement 
by adjudication (with its distinctive "process" and other values) 
would also be far less effective. Rules structure adjudicative 
processes to provide fair participation, and also establish standards 
for defining the issues and determining what is relevant. 
Corporations, trusts, and other "legal inventions" are creatures 
of rules and thus could not exist without them. Indeed, cen- 
tralized government itself would probably be impossible in a com- 
plex society without rules defining roles in the required division 
of legal labor. This is not only because in a sizeable society any 
such division must be elaborate and complex. It is also because the 
officialdom could not command legitimacy, for there would 
simply be no sufficiently defined governmental set-up to serve as 
the object of this legitimacy. 
Rules also distinctively facilitate private ordering of affairs 
without official intervention. They can guide and induce private 
parties not to interfere with others, and enable private parties to 
coordinate their activities. Without firm and known rules, there 
would be far more interference with each other's plans, and far 
less effective social coordination. Elemental rules of the criminal 
law and basic rules of the road are aptly illustrative. 
In sum, rules can help bring many values to social life. Resort to 
them is to be encouraged, as appropriate. When judges harbor and 
publicly act upon a working conception of law as pre-existing 
rule, they presumably encourage each other generally to resort to 
rules - and doubtless we end up with more (and presumably 
better formed) rules than we otherwise would have. 
What of sound reason in matters legal? Well-formed rules may 
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even be evil in content. And sound content is widely called for in 
the law, not just in those provinces governable by rules. Except 
when reason peters out and fiat is necessarily called for, soundly 
reasoned content is always possible in law, too. Yet in a significant 
proportion of cases the content of American law, at least, is not 
sound. The "rule" of Butterfield v. Forrester that contributory 
negligence of a plaintiff is a complete bar to any recovery, though 
extreme, is only one of many examples (though it is now being 
overhauled). 
If more judges were to adopt and publicly act upon a working 
conception of the law as a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting 
considerations, what would be the likely side effects? The corollary 
norm for legal actors that this behavioral shift would "imply" is: 
"Generally do things by sound reason." The side effects of thus 
promoting this norm would presumably include more soundly 
reasoned content than would otherwise exist. 
It is not to me evident that the normative side effects of a wor- 
king notion of law as reason would necessarily be less important 
to individuals and society than the normative side effects of a law 
as rules notion. Indeed, some theorists have even argued that a 
system of law would not be possible without a certain "minimal" 
core of soundly reasoned content.19 To the extent that the norma- 
tive side effects of a reason conception contribute to maintenance 
of this core of content, such effects would be of the most pro- 
found significance. 
Rule proponents might argue that officials simply need more 
encouragement to make rules than they do to act by reason. 
Hence the likely normative side effects of following a rule concep- 
tion are of greater value, and the case for this notion correspon- 
dingly stronger. Doubtless officials have often failed to make rules 
when they could and should have. But substantive content 
contrary to reason has been all too familiar in law, too. Indeed, in 
this century, as never before, laws of the most heinous kind have 
been operative within some societies for extended periods. Of 
19 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, chapter 9. 
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course, pre-existing levels could make a difference. A particular 
society might, for example, be greatly deficient in rules. In that 
event, the normative side effects of adopting and publicly acting 
upon a rule conception would be all the more desirable, for a 
time. 
Thus far in this exploratory venture, I tentatively conclude: (1) 
that in terms of their comparative efficacy in serving the primary 
functions of a working conception, there is more to be said for 
"the law as reason" than for "the law as rules"; and (2) that in 
terms of the comparative value of their likely normative side 
effects, any claim that the rule conception has an edge is at best 
inconclusive. 
6. THE "REASON" AND THE "RULE" ALTERNATIVES: 
CONSEQUENCES WHEN OFFICIALS BECOME PREOCCUPIED 
Judges not merely hold and act on working notions of law in 
desirable ways; they also become obsessed with them, and this 
factor contributes to unwise decisions. It may be that one of the 
two basic alternatives is preferable on the ground that general pre- 
occupation with it has less objectionable consequences. To map 
out such likely consequences would be no simple task. What I 
offer here must also be less ambitious.20 
I will first review how judicial obsession may show itself in 
particular cases, and identify its main causes. Ajudge obsessed with 
a working conception will not abandon it when that is the wise 
course, but a judge who is not obsessed will readily turn to other 
phenomena of the law, as appropriate. For example, a judge pre- 
occupied with a working notion of the law as pre-existing rule will 
be more inclined to tolerate even an exceedingly harsh rule 
(Butterfield v. Forrester) than he will be to overrule or modify 
that rule. This judge will also be less inclined to recognize a 
20 It might be that one of the two alternatives is preferable on the ground 
that those who hold it will simply be less likely to become obsessed with it 
in the first place. I cannot go into this here. 
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genuine case of first impression for what it is and instead will tend 
to cling even to a remote pre-existing rule "by analogy." Such a 
judge will want to "distinguish" conflicting precedent rather than 
confront the real choice at hand. Similarly, he will be disinclined 
to create exceptions (for this will not appear "law-like"). Further, 
a judge preoccupied merely with the idea that law consists of pre- 
existing rules will, in my view, be more likely to read statutes and 
case-law precepts literally rather than in light of their rationales, 
for he will think of the latter as somehow unfaithful to the wor- 
ding of the real law. And our obsessed judge will be inclined to 
read case-law precepts and even statutes governing private consen- 
sual arrangements as if they always ousted general equitable prin- 
ciples that come into play in the particular case. 
Similarly, a judge may become obsessed with a conception of 
law as the reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations. 
This might lead him, for example, to refuse to give a pre-existing 
rule its appropriate due, or to make new law without sufficient 
regard to how it harmonizes with existing law. 
The foregoing examples are not exhaustive, but in each the 
judge fails to see that a working conception, however useful 
generally, has limits of its own. For a working notion of law is 
only a "partial" schematization of the law's justificatory resources 
that may have rational bearing. Thus there is more to phenomena 
of the law than rules: equities in the particular case, appropriate 
discretionary judgment, general ideas of justice and the common 
good, reason as such, and more. Moreover, pre-existing rules may 
simply not apply, and are thus limited in this way, too. Yet in 
relevant instances of prejudicial preoccupation, the judge "plays 
by the conception" - sticks to the idea of a pre-existing rule - 
even when that is quite inappropriate because the particular rule 
is inapplicable, or other facets of "the law" come into play (or 
both of these). 
At the same time, there is also more to phenomena of the law 
than the reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations. 
Thus there are rules (with the reasons for them). There is even fiat. 
And more. 
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Why do some judges become obsessed with their working 
notions of law? First, if a given notion generally stands judges in 
good stead, this may lead them to over-use it. In such instances, 
judges fail to recognize that the conception, like any such idea, has 
its limits. Second, a few judges may mechanically substitute their 
working conception for close analysis of particulars. It thus 
becomes a crutch, and an anodyne for the pains of reasoning. 
Third, the normative influences of an adopted working conception 
may be direct, too, and not confined merely to side effects. That 
is, some judges may unconsciously take the conception directly as 
a standard for what "the law" always ought to be, e.g., a pre- 
existing rule, or some ideal of reason. Fourth, the working concep- 
tion a judge has may lead him to lapse into a more or less habitual 
predisposition that influences his decisions without rising to the 
level of a normative influence. 
Let us turn, then, to what a legal system as a whole would 
presumably look like if it were to go awry and if this were attrib- 
utable to widespread preoccupation with one or the other of the 
two basic alternatives. I will take up the probable state of affairs 
under a pre-existing rule conception first. Again, I offer rationalistic 
speculation: 
(1) "The law" would generally be "nailed down" in rules in 
advance, even when discretion or other forms of open-endedness 
would be more appropriate. This would bring more predictability 
and equality before the law. 
(2) The general quality of the substantive content of the rules 
would decline, for predictability of outcomes under rules would 
be the primary qualitative concern. It would generally be thought 
more important to have predictable outcomes than to have rules 
otherwise good. Also, there would be a tendency to think that 
more issues are truly matters of fiat than would be so under a 
regime of "reason legality." 
(3) There would be general unresponsiveness to desires for 
changes in existing rules, and the burden of proof would be 
heavily on advocates for change. As a result the rules would 
change relatively little, even when initially bad or later quite 
outmoded. 
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(4) Only in the most obvious cases would pre-existing com- 
mon law rules be superseded by "equities arising in the particular 
circumstances," and such equities would almost never displace 
explicit statutory language, even when it deals with private con- 
sensual arrangements. 
(5) Except for issues plainly political or ideological, few more 
or less wholly new rules would be introduced. Thus it would be 
widely assumed that novel cases of first impression and new 
statutory needs are rare. (After all, it would be thought in the very 
nature of law that it is something that pre-exists.) 
(6) At least those judges who leave the reasons for the rules out 
of their working conceptions would generally interpret and apply 
law in accord with "plain meaning" and other literal methods 
rather than in accord with rationale-oriented methods, for it 
would be assumed that only the former are faithful to the true 
rules (especially their wording). 
The foregoing might be called an "excess of rule legality." 
There might even today be legal systems that approximate the one 
I have sketched. And widespread preoccupation with a working 
idea of "the law" as pre-existing rule may significantly account 
for such a system. 
What might a legal system look like that has gone seriously awry 
in circumstances in which this is significantly attributable to 
widespread preoccupation with a notion of the law as a reasoned 
reconciliation of conflicting considerations? My account here must 
be even more speculative, for, to my knowledge, nothing approx- 
imating such a system has existed, at least not in recent times. We 
do, however, know what it is like for a particular judge to be 
obsessed with a reason conception, and it is possible to extrapolate 
from this. In offering the account below of an "excess of reason 
legality," I will be striving evenhandedly to characterize an opposite 
polarity that is roughly the same "distance from mid point" as 
the polarity of excessive rule legality I have already characterized. 
(1) Formulations of "the law" in terms of rules would general- 
ly be left to the future, "for then we would know more." Hence, 
less law would be "nailed down" in advance of specific occasions 
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for applying it, inasmuch as there would be a general desire to 
leave scope for the free play of reason, and what is rationally 
relevant (as well as its force) can be fully determined only in light 
of the details of actual cases as they arise. 
(2) The quality of the substantive content of rules and other 
forms of law would be the primary concern in lawmaking, and 
predictability of outcome secondary. Thus, the general quality 
of the content of law would improve, but there would be some 
loss of predictability, and of evenhandedness. 
(3) The existing law would tend to change more with mere 
changes in personnel. For example, new judges would stand 
ready to remake the law even though their notions of reason 
might not differ much from those of predecessors. Predictability 
would decline, and costly resources would be expended as well. 
Also, there would be losses in terms of evenhandedness - of 
equality before the law. 
(4) There would be ready responsiveness to demands for 
changes in the law, especially demands rooted in new develop- 
ments requiring that new ideas of reason be brought to bear. 
This, too, would generate some loss of predictability and would 
likewise entail investment of more resources in lawmaking. It 
would diminish official evenhandedness over time, too. 
(5) In the application of law, any significant equities between 
the parties arising in the particular case would triumph over pre- 
existing rule far more often than under a regime of rule legality. 
(6) Rationale-oriented modes of interpretation would generally 
be brought to bear when applying the law, and in the guise of 
these, judges and others would also sometimes bring in their own 
merely personal notions of reason to interpret the law. 
The foregoing excesses of "reason legality" are (in my view) the 
main risks of widespread preoccupation with a working notion of 
law as the reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations. 
Are these more serious than the corresponding risks of widespread 
preoccupation with a working notion of law as pre-existing rules? 
I cannot here consider this issue at length. The biggest losses under 
the "regime of reason" appear to be losses in predictability, in 
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evenhandedness, in excessive diversion of resources into lawmaking 
activities, and in, perhaps, undue substitution by some judges of 
their own merely personal notions of reason. These strike me as, 
on the whole, less serious than the widespread losses likely over 
time under a "regime of rules," in terms of quality of substantive 
content. 
I, for one, would rather live under a regime run by officials 
obsessed with reason than under a regime run by officials ob- 
sessed with rules. Of course, we need not choose between such 
extremes. I merely suggest that if called upon to live under one 
or the other, the reason regime seems less objectionable. The same 
would be true, mutatis mutandis, even if, as is far more likely, the 
society involved falls somewhere between the two extremes. Thus 
it will not do to say that if some preoccupation with a working 
conception is inevitable, it is better that this be with a rule rather 
than a reason conception. Again, the starting point could, however, 
make a difference. A particular society might be greatly deficient 
in rules, for example. In that event, widespread resort to a rule 
conception might be more desirable (for a time), even with the 
excesses of rule legality that the inevitable preoccupations of some 
judges would bring. 
Given that many judges appear to hold a rule conception of 
"the law," and given that some more or less inevitably become ob- 
sessed with the law as pre-existing rule, this factor may well be one 
important explanation for the refusal of the court in Maki v. 
Frelk to overrule the harshest doctrine of the common law. In any 
event, it is almost certain that preoccupation with a reason con- 
ception would not have led the judges to their decision. 
7. CONCLUSION 
After hundreds of years in which a working conception of law as 
pre-existing rule seems to have held sway, might it not be time for 
judges generally to try reason as an alternative - for a few years 
anyway? In my view, the serviceability of this alternative as a 
working conception is superior. Also, the argument for a rule con- 
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ception based on allegedly preferable normative effects is at best 
inconclusive. Further, I believe the consequences of any obsession 
with a reason conception would generally be less untoward. 
But working conceptions are not like hats of the wrong fit. 
They have to be unlearned, not merely removed. This kind of lear- 
ning runs deep and becomes second nature. After a while, it may 
not be unlearnable without resort to methods that would not be 
acceptable. Thus the change I propose, even if desirable, is prob- 
ably long off. 
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